ger Sees Soviets Beset, Open to Ta

By Robert C. Toth and Doyle McManus Los Angeles Times

NEW YORK—Faced with masive internal problems, senior leadrs in the Soviet Union are moving ingerly into a "negotiating phase" with the United States in hopes of aining a respite from East-West ensions at an acceptable diplomatic rice, former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger says.

Kissinger called for a bipartisan S. commission to be created iminediately after the Nov. 6 election to embark on a "crash program" for irms control strategies and a framework for U.S.-Soviet relations in general that would reduce the threat of nuclear holocaust and

avert superpower gonfrontations.

The commission's aim, he said in an hour-long interview in his Manhattan office, would be conceptual approaches acceptable to both the American public and the Soviet Union.

The path toward negotiations will be "prolonged," Kissinger said, in part because the Soviet leadership has not yet decided on its precise goals for the negotiations.

Nonetheless, in the wake of Soviet Foreigh Minister Andrei A. Grunyko's meeting with President Reagan opportunities may exist for improving the long-frozen relationship between Washington and Moscow, he suggested.

The significance of the Gromyko visit is, most importantly, that it took place," Kissinger said, although "it was the first part of an overture in what could be a threeact opera."

Predicting no further steps, such as another Gromyko meeting with Reagan or Secretary of State George P. Shultz, before the election, Kissinger said he considered such dramatic new overtures less desirable than efforts to promote serious, less visible exchanges.

Kissinger focused in the interview on the changing Soviet attitude that Gromyko's visit appeared to signal. Kissinger presented a broad picture of an aging Kremlin leadership beset by internal rivalries between the Communist Party's cadres on the one hand and its defense, foreign policy and intelligence bureaucracies on the other, and facing problems with the Soviet economy and Eastern European satellites that challenge the foundations of the Soviet system Approved For Release 2008/11/25 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000100110038-8

Former Secretary of State Suggests Bipartisan Panel to Set Strategies

ward agreements with the Soviets generally, he said.

"What it [the situation] tells me ... is that it is very important that we confront them with concrete proposals so they have specific decisions to make," he said.

Kissinger said he believed that

Reagan, who ran for president as a critic of detente, had come to accept the necessity of reaching a basic accommodation with the Soviet

But he said he worried that some administration officials still opposed negotiations and that the president had not focused on the necessity of making specific proposals and general assertions of good will to Moscow.

"I see no substantial difference between what the administration now says and what we used to characterize as detente," he said with a

small smile. "President Reagan has probably learned a dimension as president that as a campaigner he did not have to address.

"Undoubtedly there are elements in the bureaucracy that have consistently doubted the utility of any negotiation, and especially of arms-control negotiation," he said in an apparent reference to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle and other administration hard-liners. This in itself is not bad. It produces a healthy debate within the government. But at some point there must be a focus for de-

"The bigger danger I see is not any lack of [Reagan's] sincerity but the danger that some people may believe that one can achieve results simply by an abstract psychological exercise of reassuring the Soviets and convincing the public that we


are sincere," he said. "That is not enough. It has to be translated into a concrete program."

Accordingly, Kissinger said, he is proposing that Reagan appoint the task force to work out a domestic consensus on U.S. goals in its relationship with the Soviets.

"I think it would be extremely helpful if, right after the election, a crash program were started on a bipartisan basis on which direction we should go," he said. "I would like to get some consensus, at least within the government, of what exactly it is we're trying to accomplish that can then be conveyed to the Soviets as a concept before you then embody it in proposals."

At the same time, he said, the administration should set up a "back channel" for informal communications with Moscow-both to help prepare the way for arms control proposals and to defuse possible regional confrontations between the two countries.

"The back channel, I think, could be set up immediately," he said. "I think this is particularly important in crisis management."



whetted the Kremi Approved For Release 2008/11/25 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000100110038-8 better relations with Washington—if the price is not too.

high, Kissinger said.

Regarding Reagan's attitude, he said, "There is no substantial difference in what the administration is now saying and what we characterized as detente" throughout the Nixon administration. Kissinger served under Nixon first as national security affairs adviser and then as secretary of state.

Kissinger said that a major obstacle to new agreements is the absence of a private channel of communication between top Soviet leaders and the United States that bypasses both sides' ponderous bureaucracies.

After the election, Kissinger advised, the administration should make "organizational changes" to end internal quarreling over proposals to make to the Soviets.


Kissinger said he believed that the Soviets opened talks with the administration because they wanted "a respite" from East-West tensions so they could concentrate on their leadership succession, domestic economy and fractious Eastern European satellites, some of which have made overtures to the West individually.

"They have realized that they are in a stalemate for a variety of reasons," he said. "Logically, they should want a respite.... And they could not be oblivious to the repeated statements of President Reagan that he wanted negotiations."

But he said the Soviets' statements suggest that they have not settled on their goals for the talks and in the short run may simply probe for concessions.

"I do not think the Soviets have yet made a decision as to where they are going to go," he said. "Indeed, what I think they are going to do in the next three to six months is take us over a number of hurdles," arguing about agendas and seeking easy U.S. concessions before settling down to serious talks.

During these maneuvers, the United States should use the time to "clarify" its own position on arms control as well as its attitude to



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East German leader Erich Honecke



half bonds among triends and neighbors, a sense of "us against them."

Dissident author Stefan Heym, who is tolerated by the regime despite a series of novels that have dealt with such taboo subjects as the thorities could ease dissatisfaction by "freeing people's minds to let the relies could ease dissatisfaction by "freeing people's minds to let the socialist system, which would go this socialist system, which would go as long way toward correcting it."

For many East Germans, the oppressiveness of the government mutures a special sense of communal bonds among triends and neighbors, a sense of "us against them."

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nends are."
leed, officials in the Ministry of German Affairs in Bonn say about one-sixth of East Ger-

Just want a chance to see a of the outside world," said a fast Berliner, nervously find of Alexanderplatz. "The ment should realize that people would still come back, se this is where their homes se this is where their homes is where their homes are."

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the 35th anniversary, one said East Germana might achief country as their home-fakey could occasionally see a spee than just this home."

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